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Actors of the Common Interest?  
The Brussels Offices of the Regionsi 
 
Justin Greenwood 
Robert Gordon University 
 
Abstract: 
 
The absence of a formal place in representative democracy at EU level 
casts sub-national authorities more as actors of EU participatory 
democracy.  Where they have specific interests to pursue their Brussels 
offices act in the same way as ‘lobbyists’, but public authorities are also 
capable of acting on broader interest sets.  This analysis is geared to 
understanding variation in the extent to which the diversely constituted 
Brussels offices of the regions can act on a broad spectrum of civil society 
interests, and thus have potential as actors of European integration in 
connecting civil society with EU institutions.    Differences in the 
orientation of offices towards either highly defined or broad agendas can 
be conceived in qualified principal-agent terms, in which the autonomy of 
offices to develop activities is the critical explanatory factor.  This 
autonomy can be derived more from the structure of principals and from 
degrees of purpose they have than from asymmetries of power between 
principals and agents, which in turn can be drawn from typologies of 
degrees of devolved authority present in different member states.  It 
predicts that territorial offices from member states with medium degrees 
of devolved authority have the greatest potential to act on a broad range 
of civil society oriented interests. 
 
Keywords: Territorial EU interest representation; representation offices; 
principal-agent theory. 
 
 
 
 
As the first two contributions to this special issue elaborate, the passage 
of functional interest representation through territorial channels at EU 
level raises a variety of intriguing issues.  There are no direct links 
between regions and the EU Committee of the Regions (CoR), because it 
is member states which propose CoR members via the Council of 
Ministers.  Appointed CoR members act as ‘experts’ in regional matters 
(Piattoni, this volume) rather than as delegates, while the CoR only has 
advisory status.  Whilst there are established arrangements which permit 
member states to designate regions to act for them in decision making in 
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the Council of Ministers, these arrangements primarily concern member 
states which are federal or quasi-federal, are limited in scope, and 
ultimately depend upon member state agreement.  In terms of the Lisbon 
Treaty, sub-national authorities are thus more actors of participatory 
democracy than of representative democracy.  Yet as public authorities 
acting in their own back yards, they are familiar with the roles of 
representative democracy, aggregating demands from civil society and 
seeking to reconcile competing claims.  They are not required by EU 
decision making structures to do these things, but they can do, and need 
to conform to expectations that they do so by the populations they serve.  
These factors place them in a distinct position in EU interest 
representation, sentiments which are expressed in the following excerpts:  
 
“Concerning the question of legitimacy, the local government 
organisations are distinct from other interest groups.  As the elected 
government bodies nearest to the people, they are able to express 
the interests and concerns of the broad citizenry and do not 
represent just the concerns and demands of certain (self-interested) 
stakeholders.” (Heinelt and Niederhafner 2008, p.175) 
 
“Brussels can indeed be considered the world capital of lobbying for 
local and regional authorities.  The activities of their representations 
in Brussels, present, however, a specific profile that partly 
distinguishes them from classic interest groups and lobbies.  The 
activities of regional representations in Brussels are broader and not 
focused solely on direct lobbying and interest representation.” 
(Huysseune and Jans 2008, p.10) 
 
Yet sub-national authorities can and do become ‘lobbyists’ for their own 
distinct interests as public authorities, responding in similar ways to other 
producer interests so as to diffuse the costs of regulation of their service 
provision (such as responsibilities for waste collection from electronic 
equipment) to other parties.  In such circumstances, they act as 
‘lobbyists’ would, taking collective action and seeking where possible to 
appeal to public interest advocates for tactical alliances likely to carry the 
broad support necessary for EU public policy-making.  Where EU public 
policy produces distributive and re-distributive benefits with territorial 
effects (such as funding schemes or where there is reliance upon a 
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particular industry), territorial authorities also have interests to maximise, 
which may structure patterns of collective action.  Many sub-national 
authorities now have offices in Brussels in pursuit of such goals.  Yet when 
public authorities do not become direct stakeholders in the distribution of 
costs and benefits, they have the opportunity to become players in wider 
systemic goals, with the potential to act as agents of EU democratic 
legitimacy by bridging territorial civil society with EU institutions.   The 
key question addressed by this article is: which of the territorial Brussels 
offices are likely to act as wider agents of EU democratic legitimacy? 
 
The ambivalence in the role of sub-national authorities at EU level is 
reflected in the European Transparency Register.  The first version (2008) 
set apart public authorities from ‘lobbyists’ by declaring that ‘public 
authorities of any level or geographical origin are not expected to register’ 
(European Commission 2008, p.2).  In a change of direction, the 
proposals for a revised version of the scheme (2011) expect 
representative offices of such authorities to register.  Are the Brussels 
offices of the regions somehow a category apart from ‘special interest 
groups’? and thus have the capacity to act as wider agents ‘of the broad 
citizenry.’  What significant differences arise between different sub-
national representations in Brussels to act as such agents, and why?  Are 
some preoccupied with using the Brussels venue for other purposes? Do 
some offices have more potential than others to act as agents of wider 
civil society (rather than of particularistic types of – primarily producer - 
interests)?  And if so, what are the predictive factors, and how are these 
operationalised?  Such questions matter, because the potential for sub-
national actors to act as two way conduits between the populations they 
serve and EU institutions has long been recognised in EU initiatives 
oriented towards popular legitimacy, most notably in the 2001 White 
Paper on Governance. 
 
Such questions about the role of the Brussels offices of the regions 
inevitably draw upon issues of ‘principals’ (those who fund such offices, 
and in turn those to whom these funders answer), and ‘agents’ (the 
offices and their employees).  Instead of following well-trodden pathways 
about degrees of homogeneity amongst principals, and mechanisms 
linking agents to principals, an alternative frame is the degree to which 
the principals start off with distinct goals.  Where principals have distinct 
goals, so it may be expected that offices act as tightly controlled 
‘mandated delegates’, with mechanisms deployed to keep agents tied to 
those goals.  Where there are more generalised factors in the 
establishment of offices, so agents would have considerable structural 
autonomy to develop activities of their own choice, provided they can be 
‘sold’ to principals as generating value.  In such a scenario, agents would 
not be treated as mandated delegates.  If employee agents are recruited 
from the EU ‘circuit’ rather than solely from the ranks of regional 
administrations, they may be more likely to develop activities which build 
European integration by linking territorial civil society with EU institutions.  
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Characteristics of the population: the Brussels offices of the 
regions 
 
A detailed interrogation of the most recent edition of a repertoire 
produced by the Committee of the Regions (CoR) of ‘Associations/Bureaux 
de Representation Regionale et Communale a Bruxelles’ (CoR 2009) 
reveals a population of 215 sub-national territorial representations in 
Brussels from the member states.  While this population is diverse, most 
of the organisations listed are territorial public authorities within the 
member states.  In a survey by Marks et al, two-thirds of the Brussels 
offices of the regions represented a single sub-national government 
(Marks et al 2002).  There are also collective units of local and regional 
authorities drawn from a distinct concept and created for the purpose of 
pooling resources for Brussels representation.   
 
Some of the Brussels territorial representations have a more diverse 
range of direct stakeholders than sub-national territorial governing 
authorities.  One such type is the public-private partnership.  Some of 
these are a concept which (as discussed later) reflects historic national 
controversies in the very concept of the establishment of a territorial 
‘representation’ in Brussels. Some public-private partnerships are more 
pragmatic creations which are orientated towards funding, partner-
searching, and branding a region.  Another concept is a widely drawn 
stakeholder membership model, embracing public authorities and regional 
development agencies alongside territorial organisations drawn from 
business and commerce, trade unions, universities, public agencies, 
organisations of the professions, and ‘third sector’ organisations.  This 
latter model is common among UK offices, which often provide a range of 
‘member services.’  Whereas offices tied to a regional authority have the 
preoccupations of that authority, usually with political guidance, offices 
based on serving members are likely to have a wider range of activities 
which reflects membership diversity.  Table 1 summarises the population 
data extracted from the CoR repertoire chosen as the focus of analysis 
here: 
 
Table 1 (About Here): Territorial Representation Offices in Brussels 
 
Balme and Chabanet note how EU mobilisation has been particularly 
strong among ‘medium range subnational authorities’ (p.62), and in 
particular the UK and the Nordic countries, where offices were established 
at an early stage, and in the case of Nordic countries ahead of accession.  
Their explanation for this is because more powerful regions from federal 
or quasi-federal states are caught up through their domestic linkages in a 
consensus between national governments and the Commission not to 
address domestic political issues (Balme and Chabanet 2008). Conversely,  
regional authorities from ‘medium’ devolved countries have a particular 
niche which makes them well placed to take up a broad set of issues 
related to European integration. 
 
The variation between territorial offices in size of establishment is very 
marked.  Unsurprisingly, offices from countries with high territorial 
devolution are well populated among the top size quartile in the Marks et 
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al survey of 2002.  Those from Germany, Austria, Belgium and Spain, 
spent an average of €447,000 each year, with some occupying 1000m² 
space (Marks et al 2002) and a budget in excess of €1m (Vleva 2008).  
The German Länder together employ 400 staff, as opposed to 150 in the 
German permanent representation (Moore 2006); some of their 
representations have the feel of sizeable diplomatic missions, complete 
with bier kellar cabins and gardens for entertaining.  At the other end of 
the spectrum, the lowest quartile of all offices in the Marks et al survey 
had budgets of less than €150,000 and floor space of less than 80m², 
where a local government or small group of localities in the same region 
might employ a single person on a shared-time basis.   
 
There are very few territorial representative offices in Brussels from 
centralised countries.  Portugal, Greece, and Ireland, had virtually no 
presence during the 1980s and 1990s, highlighting the weakness of 
linkage between funding receipts and a Brussels presence.  The small 
number of territorial representative offices from these countries arrived at 
a later time, often led by a regional development agency.  Most central 
and eastern European countries remain highly centralised, with the partial 
exception of Poland and Hungary.  From 2004 accession countries, Poland 
has the greatest presence of territorial offices in Brussels, with a small 
office for each of its eighteen administrative regions.  These are 
undertakings of typically 1-3 staff, exercising minimal functions such as 
information tasks, and working under some degree of co-ordination 
assistance from the national permanent representation (Riedel 2010).   
These offices also provide a means of EU oriented training for future civil 
servants, often relying upon internships for their staffing.  ‘Offices’ from 
some of the other accession countries have proved somewhat more 
transient.  In worst-case scenarios, there are symbolic directory entries 
listing no more than a Brussels postal address box.   
 
Classifying countries by degrees of devolved authority to the regions is a 
cottage industry in itself, with a variety of complexities, but a variety of 
sources yield a ‘rough and ready’ broad consensus as to the following 
contemporary degrees of classification: 
 
Table 2 (About Here): Degrees of Devolved Authority in the Member-
States 
 
Only regions from ‘Medium’ and ‘High’ devolution countries have offices 
with sufficient capacity to be a focus of analysis here.  The extent of 
competence of territorial authority will always be a key, though not sole, 
factor, in shaping the nature of Brussels regional offices (Marks et al, 
2002).  The categories of ‘low’ and ‘medium’ and ‘high’ to some extent 
overlap, with the possibility to create sub-categories such as ‘high-
medium’ and ‘medium-low’ based on a variety of indicators which 
structure centre-regional relationships (Watts, 2006).  Nonetheless, as is 
discussed below, the concept of categories of devolution, with a broadly 
based distinction between ‘medium’ and ‘high,’ does help to predict which 
types of offices are most placed to develop broad agendas connected with 
European integration.  The starting point for this is that offices tied to a 
single regional authority are the norm for countries with a high level of 
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devolved authority apart from Belgium, where Flanders and Wallonia have 
spawned public/private partnership models.  Belgian ‘exceptionalism’ is 
discussed later. 
 
 
Variance in goal specificity: which factors explain the emergence 
and development of the Brussels territorial offices? 
 
Offices from the regions started to appear in Brussels in the mid 1980s, 
the first in 1984 and rising in number to almost 100 ten years later, and 
to 170 in 2001 (see the review in Mamadouh 2001).  Some aspects of the 
development of these follow EU milestones which seemed likely to boost 
the ‘regional agenda’ in future years.  These general stimuli included: the 
creation of the Committee of the Regions; the Treaty on European Union 
clauses on subsidiarity; permitting the representation of member states 
by sub-national authorities in the Council of Ministers (BELO 2009); and 
significant investment in structural and research fund instruments.   
 
The establishment of some territorial offices in Brussels related to these 
events seems to have lacked specific focus other than a growing sense of 
the need to be where the action seemed to be happening, a recognition 
that a Brussels representative office had become the norm among 
territorial authorities (Riedel 2010), a response to a competitor region 
establishing a representative office, a status symbol, or to ‘signpost’ a 
region.  The Brussels cocktail circuit flourished while some offices were 
seeking to develop their role, with regional delights freely proffered.  
Where there was a lack of focus, offices needed to find useful things to do 
and attract constituencies of support along the way aimed at 
organisational maintenance.  This latter pathway of development is of 
particular significance to this enquiry, because in such offices lay the 
autonomy to develop activities with wider connections to European 
integration, rather than following more specific goal pursuits laid down by 
principals. 
 
When the Committee of the Regions failed to develop beyond a model of 
‘experts about the regions’ into a model of political representation in EU 
decision making, some Brussels territorial offices found their feet with 
more focused agendas (Marks et al 2002; Huysseune and Jans 2008), 
generating workloads which demanded office expansion.  Tatham argues 
that ‘first league’ regions (from countries with high devolution) became 
oriented towards influencing public policy, while ‘second league’ regions 
with less significant domestic powers primarily chased funding orientated 
goals (Tatham, 2008).   For ‘first league’ regions, the possibility to 
represent a member state in the Council of Ministers meant the need to 
focus their resources accordingly, rather than seeking a role which might 
lead them into developing activities related to European integration.  
Among the German Länder, Knodt saw also an initial orientation towards 
the structural funds, and later as a response to poor information flows 
from federal ministries (Knodt 2002); there is now a ‘ Länderbeobachter ‘ 
office in Brussels whose sole mission is to observe and report to the 
Länder on meetings of the Council of Ministers.  All these activities 
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therefore denote goals which were highly defined by principals, but other 
offices had some autonomy to define other roles for themselves. 
 
In the case of ‘second league’ regions, the establishment of an office in 
Brussels might have been a symbolic measure to help support claims of 
local political leaders to have played a part in ‘winning EU funding’, 
despite the reality that such funds are primarily distributed as a result of 
decisions made by national governments in putting forward regional 
candidates (Greenwood Levy and Stewart 1995; Marks et al, in Keating 
2006; Olsson 2009).  Once the symbolic function had been fulfilled, so 
offices had to find ways to develop their roles further.  In funding pursuit 
mode, offices saw their role as being linked to economic development, 
becoming ‘network brokers’ for SMEs and universities so as to enhance 
the capacity of a region to access targeted funding instruments, looking to 
stimulate new cross-national partnerships.  Once offices had gone as far 
as they could with funding, so offices sought to create other agendas to 
justify their existence, creating potential for the development of agendas 
related to civil society.   
 
The act of devolving authority carries with it significant potential for 
centre-region power struggles (Watts, 2006).  The degree of this naturally 
varies according to the extent of alignment of domestic governing parties 
between the centre and the regions, but the potential for structural 
conflict is generally higher with greater degrees of devolved authority, in 
which Brussels inevitably became the latest venue in the ongoing 
battleground of relations between territorial authorities and central 
government.   The issue came to greatest prominence in cases 
surrounding the establishment of offices from the German Länder, the 
Spanish Communidad Autonomas, and regions with special autonomous 
status in Italy.  The presence of these offices in Brussels raised substantial 
national sensitivities about who had the right of external representation, 
leading to national constitutional court test cases to establish whether a 
regional ‘representation’ in Brussels was compatible with national law, or 
ultra vires.  The cases themselves, and the structural tensions in centre-
regional relations which underlie them, significantly shape the degree of 
purpose which the Brussels regional offices from these countries have, 
and the roles they undertake, and therefore here to assess their potential 
to undertake actions linked to European integration.  Territorial offices 
locked in ongoing power struggles with central government, or with an 
institutionalised role in the EU policy process, have highly focused 
agendas which tie the workload of staff.   
 
In Germany, the legal issues resulted in an early compromise whereby 
territorial offices initiallyii chose low- key names such as ‘information 
bureau’ (Moore 2006).  Once the right to a Brussels office was recognised, 
the result was the establishment of ‘representative missions to Brussels’ 
up to a substantial size, varying from municipalities to state level.  
Territorial presences in Brussels from Spainiii and Italy,iv typically had to 
operate under camouflage within the offices of a chamber of commerce 
mission, until such time as the court rulings went in favour of the regional 
authorities (Badiello 1998).  The final outcome was that the regional 
authorities from high devolution countries, typically representing a 
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regional government, could establish larger and more prominent 
capacities in Brussels in which a significant part of their activities were 
taken up either by protect/promote their own political agendas in EU or in 
domestic politics, or/and acting as ‘watchdogs’ of their member states in 
Brussels.  This is also reflected in the nature of relationships with 
permanent representations.  In countries of ‘medium’ devolved authority, 
where centre/regional relations are less fraught than in ‘high’ devolution 
countries, there is typically an informal working relationship between the 
regional office of the country concerned and the national permanent 
representation in Brussels, with notably close ties on dossiers of mutual 
interests to be found in the Dutch, British, Swedish and Finnish cases.  In 
‘high’ devolution countries, such as Germany and Spain, this relationship 
can be more formal, and sometimes tense, and in the case of Germany 
some of the municipal authority offices have no access to the permanent 
representation. 
 
Territorial authorities from high devolution countries typically staff their 
Brussels offices from amongst their own pool of employees, rather than 
looking to rely upon recruitment from the pool of EU orientated staff to be 
found in Brussels who might be more orientated towards agendas about 
European integration.  When these staff are sent as secondees to Brussels 
on limited life appointments, it increases the control of the ‘principal’ over 
the ‘agent’, and reduces the likelihood over time that the agent might ‘go 
native’ in Brussels.  For regional governments it has been a common (but 
not exclusive) arrangement to second civil servants to their Brussels office 
for a limited duration; from Germany, a norm is for periods of up to four 
years (see also Moore 2006, who gives a figure of 2-3 years).  A variation 
is the regional offices from Italy, which employ a mixed model of office 
staffing based on a core of ‘civil servants’ sent by, and tied to, the 
regional authority, but supplemented by a number of ‘consultants’ working 
on fixed duration EU funded projects who are recruited from the pool of 
EU specialists in the Brussels job market.  These latter staff may bring 
with them a set of interests and experiences which are not tied to those of 
a specific regional authority, but more European in orientation.  In tandem 
with arrangements for staff deployment is that the work of offices from 
countries with regional governing authorities is overseen by a deputy of 
the President of the region (see also Badiello, 1998).   
 
Employment related conditions can thus ensure that the principals have 
the means to keep their agents true to their goals, and restrict the ability 
of agents to develop a wider range of activities (such as those related 
more to European integration).  In Pitkin’s terms, these civil servants are 
more ‘delegates’ than ‘agents’ with significant degrees of autonomy (Pitkin 
1967), operating to specific instructions from ‘head office’, and there is 
therefore limited scope for agents to stray from agendas designated by 
principals.  The cumulative effect is that the roles of Brussels offices from 
‘high’ devolution countries are more orientated towards interest agendas 
prescribed by regional authorities than wider agendas connected to 
European integration. 
 
Where the staff of Brussels offices are not career public servants on 
limited period secondments from a sender authority back home, but come 
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instead from a general pool of ‘EU experts’ on the Brussels scene, so they 
are more likely to have orientations towards European integration.  There 
is just such a cadre of career mobile, Brussels based staff with strong EU 
connections, typically with a multi-lingual (and sometimes multi-national) 
background, and extensive knowledge of how the EU works. The cadre of 
anciens from the College of Europe are typical members of this pool, and 
some of the regions have specific schemes to fund scholarships at the 
College.  They have a strong European orientation, are highly networked, 
and have interests in working on issues which are European in nature 
rather than tied to a remit of a principal sending authority. Such 
individuals can be identified among the pool of Brussels offices, with 
remits including citizenship and e-participation health, social policy, youth 
and education.  In Pitkin’s terms, these qualify as ‘agents’ rather than 
‘delegates’ (Pitkin, 1967).  These staff are disproportionately more likely 
to be found in the offices of countries of ‘medium’ devolution where the 
working language is one of the main languages of the EU.     
 
Saurugger sees the presence of such EU professionals in a somewhat 
problematic way, in that the ‘professionalisation’ of EU interest 
representation denotes the distance of organised civil society from ‘grass 
roots’ civil society (Saurugger 2006), characterised by a narrow, almost 
private dialogue in which ‘Brussels talks to Brussels’.  Saurugger’s thesis 
has echoes of the rather hostile treatment of professionals in ‘public 
choice’ traditions, where the pursuit of private interest is seen as a core 
problem resulting in damage to wider public interests, and the solution is 
in finding ways of increased accountability to principals.  Another 
interpretation is of a ‘new class’ with the capacity to perceive and 
represent common interests, a kind of emancipatory force as a result of 
their distance from the ‘old classes’ of capital and labour, with a liberal 
‘culture of critical discourse’ (Gouldner 1979).  Such a tradition applied 
here would place emphasis upon a cadre of European orientated, Brussels 
based professionals working for territorial offices who use their relatively 
autonomous positions to create civil society-wide agendas.   
 
Another issue with the potential to impact upon the extent of functions 
performed by a Brussels territorial office is whether it represents a single 
or multiple municipalities.  Multiple authority offices (most frequently 
found from the Netherlands) have been found to be much more oriented 
towards seeking to exercise political influence than are single locality 
offices (Marks et al, 2002).  Over time, some territorial offices have 
consolidated into a model which involves some degree of collaboration so 
as to operate from the same address.  Such scales of collaboration might 
involve sharing back-office facilities, through to a concept designed to 
facilitate functional collaboration on topics of common interest.  In the 
Dutch ‘G-4’ Brussels office, an individual represents one each of the large 
four Dutch cities (Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam, Utrecht), but share 
a collective office identity.   These distinctions may carry implications for 
the type of work an office will undertake.  In principal-agent terms, the 
dilution of control among multiple principals might result in a higher 
degree of autonomy for agents.  But give that the establishment of such 
offices require a degree of purpose in their establishment between 
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multiple funding principals, the scope to develop activities beyond these 
those defined by principals might be limited. 
 
Thus, some extent of difference between the remit of Brussels territorial 
offices cannot be explained by comparing national degrees of 
decentralisation.  Differences can be found among the remit of offices 
from individual countries.  Knodt, for instance, finds that competition 
between Länder helps explain differences in the capacities of their 
Brussels offices, noting differences in their abilities to interact strategically 
with EU authority on the basis of their involvement in networks.  Using 
network analysis, she finds Baden Wűrttemburg’s participation in EU 
networks to be ‘tighter’ and ‘denser’ when compared to Lower Saxony 
(Knodt 2002; see also Knodt in this volume).  Network participation can 
be expected to influence the extent to which an office is likely to become 
drawn into corresponding activities; as is described later, Brussels 
territorial offices participate in a variety of networks with orientations 
towards citizen interests.  But the variation between Brussels territorial 
offices is greatest when comparing offices by degrees of decentralisation, 
in which national traditions are a foremost factor. 
 
Thus far, a proposition seems to be emerging; that territorial offices from 
member states with a ‘medium’ degree of decentralised authority may 
have had sufficient autonomy and agenda space to develop self-generated 
activities which cover broad segments of civil society interests, and which 
may therefore have the potential to contribute to deepening EU 
democratic legitimacy.  To develop this further, some analysis is 
undertaken of the activities and structures of offices from member states 
with ‘medium’ degrees of devolved authority. 
 
 
Brussels Territorial Offices as Actors of the Common Interest 
 
A key issue in assessing differences of activities among Brussels territorial 
offices is the way in which the purposes of the individual offices are 
defined and interpreted by those concerned with their governance.  In 
turn, the preceding discussion has indicated a number of ways in which 
the structure of ‘principals’ will influence the agendas of their agents. 
Some types of Brussels offices of the regions have been agents relatively 
free to use their station to create diverse agendas and activities.   
 
The survey by Marks et al confirms that the population as a whole 
undertake an eclectic range of activities, in which the offices rated just 
about every type of activity reviewed above as of some importance in 
their overall workload (Marks et al 2002).  These activities might be 
summarised as helping to connect the region – and the interests 
embedded within it - with Brussels, as well as Brussels with their region.  
However, in a (2008) survey of the Directors of 40 Brussels offices, Olsson 
notes a great variation in the extent to which the offices communicate ‘the 
regional goals achieved in Brussels to the constituents at home’ (Olsson 
2009, p.26).  Olsson notes that most of the interviewees saw it as their 
role to ‘bring Europe closer to the elites at home’ (Olsson 2009, p.26).  
Many had invested time in bringing local elites to Brussels; in a survey 
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involving the participation of 123 of the Brussels regional offices, 
Huysseune and Jans report that an office hosts an average of 635 visitors 
each year (Huysseune and Jans 2008).  Brussels office specific websites of 
the territories are full of news about a visit by a regional political figure, 
but also about visits by stakeholder groups in their own territories. 
 
Whilst the agendas of most of the Federal countries are dominated by 
institutional participation, and centre-local relations, the Belgian regions 
are less pre-occupied with monitoring central government.  This is 
because the centre is too weak relative to the regions, with the regions 
undertaking national functions for EU representation; thus, the Brussels 
Capital office is located within the Belgian permanent representation 
(Goergen 2006).  The result is that Belgian regions having the space to 
develop agendas beyond domestic power struggles, which can be citizen 
oriented.  Thus, the EU agency of Flanders includes within its mission 
‘interface with Flemish civil society’ and ‘raising awareness among the 
general public’ (Vleva 2008, p.4), while its Annual Report advises the EU 
institutions to ‘find a different way of listening to the European citizens, in 
order to decrease the democratic deficit’ (ibid, p.8).   
 
Among ‘medium’ devolution countries, similar orientations are evident.  
The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, which first 
secured a Brussels presence in 1992,  defines one of the benefits of its EU 
policy that ‘public discussion about EU affairs is deepened’ (LOGON 2002, 
p.98).  There is a dense collection of civil society orientated networks in 
which the Brussels offices of the territorial authorities participate, many of 
which were created on the initiative of one, or a small cluster, of offices.  
Examples include: the European Network of Social Authorities (ENSA); the 
European Local Inclusion and Social Action Network (ELISAN); the Social 
Inclusion Regional Group (SIRG); the European Association of Regional 
and Local Authorities for Lifelong Learning (EARLLL); ERRIN, the European 
Regions Research Innovation Network, which has a sub-committee 
structure which includes a Health Network; Euro Health Net; European 
Regional and Local Health Authorities’ (EUREGHA) network.  These 
networks are disproportionately populated by regional offices from 
countries with ‘medium’ devolved authority, while SIRG, ENSA, and 
EARLL, were all established from an initiative taken by one such office, 
and the Health network of ERRIN is led by another. ENSA has ongoing 
projects involving disability and inclusion, care of the elderly, and youth 
inclusion, as well as past projects focusing on immigrants’ integration, 
foster carers, and child protection.  The health networks have civil society 
orientations, including the prevention of suicide among young people.  
EUREGHA includes among its objectives ‘to improve the collaboration 
among Brussels Regional Offices’ as well as ‘to cooperate with relevant 
stakeholders such as NGOs’ (Euregha, 2011).  And ELISAN declares itself 
‘towards a social Europe that fulfils the citizens needs’ (Elisan, 2011). 
 
Examples of social related agendas are apparent from the websites of the 
Brussels territorial EU offices.   Stockholm region showcases its 
involvement in the Interreg (IV C) funded ‘People Project’, aiming ‘to 
reinforce the cohesion and social welfare in the participating regions and 
find solutions to address some of the consequences of the economic down 
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turn’ (People Project, 2010).  One strand of this involves ‘Civil Society 
empowerment’, involving ‘all those organisations through which citizens 
participate in social life,’ (PEOPLE handbook p.110) in which such 
organisations are invited to participate in interventions aimed at their 
capacity building. The North West (of England) Brussels Office, which 
includes the North West Health Brussels Office (NWHBO), a partnership of 
the principal public sector health agencies in the territory, is a member of 
the EU NGO the European Public Health Alliance (EPHA).  The NWBHO’s 
’10 Areas for Action’ to ‘Prioritise our Health’ (North West Health Brussels 
Office 2010) are very similar to those of the EPHA.  Similarly, the Veneto 
office incorporates a unit of health policy staff which have participated in 
an EU funded project aimed at addressing health inequalities. 
 
Whilst network participation is drawn from offices from a mixture of ‘high’ 
and ‘medium’ devolution countries, the majority of examples are drawn 
from the ‘medium’ category.  It is nonetheless important not to over-state 
the case, and there will be exceptions to generally observed trends.  In 
the case of medium devolved authorities, the website of a Brussels 
territorial office from a Finnish region states that it’s ‘website is not a 
general information site for the public at large, but rather a 
communication tool between the EU office and the region’ (Tampere 
Central Region, 2010).  Nonetheless, it is apparent from a scan of some of 
the ‘most likely cases’ drawn from countries with medium degrees of 
devolved authorities (plus the special case of Belgium, discussed earlier) 
that there are a broad range of civil society oriented activities undertaken, 
as well as more narrowly constituted economic development type actions.  
Conversely, there are examples to be found from regions in high 
devolution countries of attempts to link civil society with the EU, but these 
initiatives are more to be found in the regions themselves (such as the 
Catalan ‘Horizon Europe’) than among the Brussels representative offices 
of regional government from high devolution countries. 
 
 
Further Discussion and Conclusions 
 
A qualified version of Principal-Agent theory seems to offer some 
interpretative clarification once adapted to the circumstances of the 
Brussels territorial offices.  Waterman and Meier (1998) apply it to the 
circumstance of bureaucratic politics.  The starting point is summarised by 
Gosnell (in Pitkin 1967), that ‘any specialisation of function involves 
representation.’  The central tenet of principal-agent theory is that there is 
an inevitable loss of control once a principal delegates a task to an agent, 
and that goal conflict arises between the parties in which the degree of 
information asymmetries can be modelled as to where the power resides.  
In turn, this can help explain policy related outcomes.  As Waterman and 
Meier explain, this is a somewhat blunt instrument in that there are many 
different relationships between principals and agents, with highly varying 
degrees of potential conflicts.  In particular, they point to critical 
variations in goal symmetry between principals and agents, among the 
number of principals, and the degree of information sharing (Waterman 
and Meier, op.cit).    One scenario outlined by these authors is that of goal 
sharing between principals and agents, in which agencies are delegated a 
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task with a goal and then left to get on with it’; ‘principals require regular 
reports, and if nothing is out of line they do nothing’ (ibid p.191).  These 
have been applied in circumstances of relationships between a ‘central’ 
and a regional office of public administrations (see, for instance, Schmidt 
2002), but are also applicable here by connecting with Pitkin’s work on 
representation. 
 
For Pitkin, the key distinction to draw is that between a ‘delegate’ with a 
specific mandate to carry out, and an ‘agent’ with higher degrees of 
discretion and autonomy to carry out a task (Pitkin 1967).  This latter role 
could involve a role in helping the principal to identify their goals where 
there is a high degree of asymmetry of expertise (Philips 1995).   This 
variation – between ‘mandated delegate’ at one extreme and quasi- 
autonomous actor at the other - seems to capture the variation in both 
the structure and the working conditions of the Brussels offices.  An 
outpost of a specific public territorial administration where staff work 
towards highly directed goals will create entirely different working 
agendas to one where agents are left with the ability to develop their own 
activities.  Whilst agency ‘problems’ arise in every type of traditionally 
defined principal-agent relationships, the impact of autonomy make it 
worthwhile emphasising the different outcomes through use of the (Pitkin 
derived) nomenclature ‘delegate’ in order to distinguish the wide gulf 
between one working in a highly mandated environment with little scope 
for autonomous activity, and another working with a relatively high 
degree of discretion. 
 
The main departure here from the model presented by Waterman and 
Meier is also one over clarity of goals.  For these authors, the clarity of 
goals is a given, with agents working with more or less autonomy towards 
these goals in shared goal situations.  In the case of the Brussels regional 
offices, the degree of goal-setting by principals is highly variable; the 
federal states have significant regional authorities whose Brussels offices 
serve them with specific goal sets, whereas those from countries with 
medium degrees of devolved authority tend towards a different model.  In 
the latter cases, offices were either established with little specific original 
focus, or as a public/private partnership model with member services, 
whose diversity of principals enable offices to develop a wide range of 
activities.  This diversity also creates structural autonomy for agents, 
either to exploit by pursuing their own interests which are then ‘sold’ to a 
member within the cognate field.  In these high autonomy/discretion 
circumstances, the explanatory drivers are not those of goal conflict or 
information asymmetries, but more the range of principals, the degree of 
purpose established by the principal/s, as well as the structural autonomy 
of the office from its principal.   
 
The varying extent of activities of the Brussels offices of the regions can 
thus be explained by the degrees of devolved authority with which they 
operate.  The workload of those from regional governing authorities 
endowed with considerable devolved authority have become orientated 
towards specific goals, such as formalised input into the EU policy process, 
and as stations reflecting their domestic power struggles viz. central 
government.  Offices from Germany, and Spain, provided clear-cut 
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examples of such cases.  Consequently, these principals have created 
mechanisms designed to retain their ability to control and prescribe the 
agendas and activities of their Brussels offices, such as the use of staff on 
limited time secondments.  The latter actors are better captured by the 
nomenclature ‘delegate’, denoting the limited scope for ‘agency problems’ 
(in principal-agent terms) compared to agents with the autonomy to 
define their own agendas, because the impact of the difference is so 
substantial. 
 
Thus, an altogether different model arises in the case of principals which 
are sub-national territorial entities from countries with ‘medium’ degrees 
of devolved authority.  These tend towards diverse constitution, meaning 
that their energies have not been preoccupied with specific purposes such 
as domestic power struggles, or routine participation in the decision 
making fora of the EU institutions.  Here, agents have been able to cast 
their agendas diversely, enabling them to pursue a broad range of civil 
society-wide activities, rather than those tied to particular interest 
stakeholders.  Offices in ‘medium’ devolved authority states can thus 
bring Europe to the regions and localities, rather than just representing 
the interests of territories to EU institutions, often in more than just a 
superficial way.  Inter alia, some offices see their role as explaining to the 
region the impact of ‘Europe’ upon it, and involving territorial civil society 
with ‘Europe’.  Here, autonomy is the key variable, in which the 
‘asymmetry’ in favour of the ‘agent’ is defined not so much by the ability 
of the principal to exercise control, but the inclination to do so.  Brussels 
territorial offices with significant autonomy are most likely to have 
developed activities which seek to connect territorial civil society with the 
EU, and it is the offices from countries with medium degrees of devolved 
authority which are most likely to have such autonomy.  Thus, the 
Brussels territorial offices from countries with medium devolved authority 
have the most potential, among the entire population of offices, to help 
connect the EU with wider civil society. 
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